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Abstract
We test the impact of a peer group savings program on precautionary savings,
through two randomized field experiments among 2,687 microcredit clients. The
first experiment finds that the Peer Group Treatment, which combines public goal
setting, monitoring in the group, and non-financial rewards, increases savings in a
new savings account significantly. The number of deposits grows 3.7-fold, and the
average savings balance almost doubles. In contrast, a more classical measure, a
substantially increased interest rate, has no effect for most participants and raises
the savings balance only for the very top of the distribution. A second experiment,
conducted a year later, tests an alternative delivery mechanism and shows that
effects of similar size can be achieved through feedback text messages, without
meetings, rewards, or peer pressure.
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1 Introduction
Peers can have both negative and positive effects on human behavior. The use of peers as
a commitment device to reach a shared but individual goal is a widely observed phe-
nomenon, both informally (e.g., running groups or study groups) and formally (e.g.,
weight-loss groups). On the other hand, peer pressure can also lead individuals to make
sub-optimal decisions (e.g., Bishop, 2006; Kremer and Levy, 2008). While self-help peer
groups have been subject to theoretical analysis (e.g., Schelling, 1984; Battaglini et al.,
2005), to our knowledge there exists no clean evidence investigating whether peer groups
make participants more likely to increase their savings, and if so, what aspects lead to
this effect.
We conducted two randomized field experiments among low-income micro-
entrepreneurs in Chile to study the power of 1) self-help peer groups and 2) peer-related
text messages for precautionary savings. Our first experiment, the “Peer Group Experi-
ment,” shows that self-help peer groups, which combine public goal setting, monitoring in
the peer group and recognition for those who comply, significantly increase savings. We
offered 2,687 micro-entrepreneurs, who met regularly in groups as clients of a microcredit
association, the opportunity to open a formal savings account. Participants were ran-
domly assigned to one of three conditions: 1) a control condition where individuals were
offered a basic savings account, 2) a “Peer Group Treatment” where participants were
offered a basic account and additionally had the option to set and publicly announce their
savings goals, which was then publicly monitored in the weekly meetings and rewarded
with a non-monetary recognition, and 3) a High-Interest Treatment where participants
were offered a savings account with a 5% real interest rate instead of the 0.3% rate in the
basic account.
Participants assigned to the Peer Group Treatment deposit 3.7 times as often into the
savings account and their average savings balance is almost twice that of the control group.
The treatment-on-the-treated effect on the total amount deposited of 25,900 Chilean
pesos (about 52 USD)1 represents about 32% of mean monthly per capita income and
corresponds in size to the type of expenditures participants had expressed wanting to build
a buffer stock for such as unexpected doctor’s visits and payments for heating, electricity
or food during periods of short-term income fluctuation.2 These expenditures are in line
1We use the exchange rate at the middle of the treatment period.
2In focus groups conducted before the interventions, participants said they frequently regret not
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with a precautionary savings model. While the amounts of savings are relatively small in
absolute terms, Kast and Pomeranz (2014) show that even such small amounts can have
significant effects on consumption smoothing and borrowing needs. Correspondingly,
participants in the Peer Group Treatment subsequently claimed to be significantly less
anxious about their financial future, consistent with other studies showing that savings
can make a substantial difference in participants’ lives (e.g., Burgess and Pande, 2005;
Ashraf et al., 2010; Brune et al., 2011; Dupas and Robinson, 2013a,b).
However, it is unclear whether the increased savings are welfare improving for our
sample. To make such a claim, we would need evidence that participants were not already
at an optimal level of savings.3 Large amounts of savings would arguably be sub-optimal
for a population that is borrowing at the same time. A certain buffer of precautionary
savings may be valuable in specific cases. For example, because of the different liquidity
of savings and loans (Zinman, 2007), the rigid schedule of the micro-loans may render
those loans unsuitable for covering irregular or unexpected financial needs (Karlan and
Mullainathan, 2009).4 This question is beyond the scope of this paper. While we are
agnostic about whether saving more is welfare increasing for these participants, the setting
can nonetheless shed light on savings behavior.
In contrast to the effect of the Peer Group Treatment, the strongly increased interest
rate has a surprisingly small effect – even though it was made exceptionally salient. While
average savings increase somewhat, the vast majority of participants do not appear to
respond to the interest rate at all. However, because the null result on the overall mean is
quite noisy, particularly in the non-winsorized specification, it has to be interpreted with
care.
Our second “Feedback Message Experiment” was conducted one year after the open-
ing of the study accounts. After having detected the overall effects of the Peer Group
Treatment, the Feedback Message Experiment was implemented to disentangle some of
having saved more and many mentioned the goal of building savings as a buffer stock for emergencies.
Participants additionally mentioned that the extra savings need to come from decreases in spending on
temptation goods and reduced borrowing. The groups that participated in the focus groups were not
included in the randomized evaluation.
3In other settings, it seems that households are quite good at making optimal decisions about saving
vs. borrowing (Telyukova, 2013; Zinman, 2015). For a more detailed discussion, see Section 2.1.
4The cost of having liquid savings at the same time as loans is represented by the interest rate on the
loan. In this context, the cost of the loan can be thought of as an insurance premium paid for having
liquid savings. In the case of Fondo Esperanza (FE), this is a 3% monthly interest rate and a 3% fixed
fee. We discuss this further in Section 2.1.
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the mechanisms and gain greater insights into which components are required for effective-
ness. The Peer Group Treatment consisted of a bundle of different, potentially important
elements. The Feedback Message Experiment strips the treatment of many of these as-
pects in order to get more information about what might be driving the effect. However,
as we discuss below, it is still a bundle of several components.
The Feedback Message Experiment was implemented among a sample of 871 partici-
pants who had opened an account in the Peer Group Experiment, owned a cell phone and
were interested in a text message service to help them save more. Participants were as-
signed to one of three groups: 1) A “Peer Pressure” weekly Feedback Message Treatment
with a real-life Savings Buddy who was also regularly informed about the performance
of the participant; 2) A “Peer Information” weekly Feedback Message Treatment with
information about savings by others; 3) A control group in which participants did not
receive any text messages. Compared to the Peer Group Treatment, the Feedback Mes-
sage Experiment removes in-person meetings, stickers, rewards and any group dynamics.
It also holds goal setting constant across treatments and control. The Savings Buddy
retains the element of peer pressure – others observing the performance of the partic-
ipant (Schelling, 1984) – while the Peer Information Treatment retains the element of
observing the performance of others (Battaglini et al., 2005).
Surprisingly, we find that the feedback message with a Savings Buddy has no larger
effect than the Peer Information Treatment that simply informs participants of their own
achievement and the success rate of other participants. These results provide suggestive
evidence that neither in-person meetings nor peer pressure are indispensable features of
the Peer Group Treatment. Even though the findings from the two separate experiments
cannot be directly compared, because the populations and time periods are different by
design, the results suggest that holding people accountable through regular feedback and
follow-up messages may increase savings almost as much as the Peer Group Treatment.
The Feedback Message Experiment suggests that modern technology – in the form of
text messages or other feedback devices – has the potential to render the accountability
mechanism of the Peer Group Treatment more scalable and potentially more attractive
to larger and different populations.
This paper makes contributions in three areas. First, it speaks to the literature on
commitment devices for saving. While much of the literature on savings commitment
devices in developed countries has studied deposit commitment devices (e.g., Madrian
and Shea, 2001; Thaler and Benartzi, 2004; Carroll et al., 2009), most of the literature
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on developing countries has focused on withdrawal commitment devices (see, e.g., Ashraf
et al., 2006b; Brune et al., 2011, and Bryan et al., 2010 for a review article). With the
notable exception of Ashraf et al. (2006a), who study the determinants of take-up for
deposit collectors in the Philippines, our paper provides one of the first analyses of the ef-
fectiveness of a deposit commitment device for developing countries. ROSCAs (Gugerty,
2007; Dupas and Robinson, 2013b) are an interesting hybrid case. Their strict deposit
and withdrawal schedule generates both a deposit and withdrawal commitment device,
and during different phases of the cycle, they function as a savings- and later a credit-
vehicle. Deposit commitment devices with liquid accounts are particularly important for
precautionary savings, since in contrast to withdrawal commitment devices, the savings
are always available in times of need. This limits the risk that the commitment device
creates welfare losses if an emergency arises. This paper demonstrates the effectiveness
of a deposit encouragement device that does not rely on a formal wage bill, and is there-
fore available to those working in the informal sector, the unemployed or independent
entrepreneurs. We are agnostic about whether the underlying mechanism for this effec-
tiveness stems from commitment or other channels such as attention.
Second, this paper provides evidence on the role of a Peer Group Treatment as a
means of encouraging a particular behavior more generally. Peer effects have been widely
shown to affect behavior, for example, with respect to productivity at work (e.g., Falk
and Ichino, 2005; Mas and Moretti, 2009; Bandiera et al., 2010), alcohol consumption
(e.g., Kremer and Levy, 2008), and financial decision-making (e.g, Duflo and Saez, 2002,
2003; Bursztyn et al., 2012; Mugerman et al., 2014). Individuals can use these effects
strategically to overcome self-control problems by joining self-help peer groups. Despite
the large prevalence of self-help peer groups in many domains, there is surprisingly little
evidence evaluating their effectiveness.5 Our findings show that our Peer Group Treatment
can provide a way in which individuals can leverage their peers to support them towards
an individual but mutually shared goal. After having found an effective policy to increase
precautionary savings, it is helpful to understand what mechanism might be driving the
result, in order to gain a better understanding about how the policy might be implemented
or scaled most effectively (Ludwig et al., 2011).
The Feedback Message Experiment takes a step in that direction. It starts to un-
5 Walsh et al. (1991) compare the effect of AA meetings to a hospital treatment. The effect of AA
meetings per se is not tested, however. Jebb et al. (2011) show that a commercial Weight Watchers (WW)
program is more effective than a standard program of care for obese individuals.
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bundle some of the mechanisms and at the same time provides an alternative delivery
mechanism for the service provided by peer group meetings, which proves to be almost
as effective. Combined with evidence that information about the savings behavior of
peers could lead to oppositional reactions (Beshears et al., 2015)6 and that simple regular
reminders can increase savings (Karlan et al., 2016)7, the results suggest that the reg-
ular feedback and follow-up could be more important to the success of the Peer Group
Treatment than the peers themselves.
Third, our finding that a large majority of participants do not increase savings when
interest rates are substantially higher and do not adjust their savings portfolio towards
the higher return account have implications for the literature on the elasticity of intertem-
poral substitution and for models and policies based on individuals’ responsiveness to the
interest rate. In addition to serving as a benchmark for the effect of peer groups, esti-
mating the interest rate elasticity of savings is interesting in and of itself as it constitutes
a key variable for many public policies. There is surprisingly little evidence on this ques-
tion (exceptions include Schaner (2011) in Kenya, and Karlan and Zinman (2014) in the
Philippines).8 The results on the interest rate also contribute to the discussion of the
relative impact of “social” or behavioral versus monetary incentives (e.g., Bertrand et al.,
2010; Ashraf et al., 2012; Chetty et al., 2013). The finding that the interest rate has
limited effectiveness for most individuals fits into a larger pattern of evidence showing the
relative effectiveness of social incentives versus monetary rewards for behavioral change
(Gneezy et al., 2011). The effect of the interest rate may be different depending on the
purpose of the savings, e.g. for long-term investments such as pension savings, it may
matter more than for precautionary savings.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents set-up and
design of both field experiments. Section 3 and 4 show the results of the Peer Group
6The evidence on peer information is in general mixed. While positive effects have been found in some
domains, such as electricity usage when bundled with tips to save energy (Allcott, 2011; Ayres et al.,
2012) or contributions to public goods (e.g., Frey and Meier, 2004; Chen et al., 2010; DellaVigna et al.,
2012), peer information has been shown to reduce work effort (Barankay, 2010) or lower take-up of tax
credits (Manoli and Bhargava, 2011). For a discussion in psychology about the ambiguous effects of peer
information, see Schultz et al. (2007).
7Reminders have also been found to be effective in other areas, for example to decrease overdraft bank
fees (Stango and Zinman, 2011), or to improve books returns to the library (Apesteguia et al., 2013),
repayment of loans (Cadena and Schoar, 2011), goal achievement in the workplace (Cadena et al., 2011),
vaccination rates (Milkman et al., 2011), and energy efficiency and conservation (Harding and Hsiaw,
2011).
8Duflo et al. (2006), Mills et al. (2008) and Engelhardt and Kumar (2009) analyze the effect of matching
contributions to individual savings plans.
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Experiment and the Feedback Message Experiment respectively. Section 5 compares the
Peer Group Treatment with the High-Interest Treatment. Section 6 concludes.
2 Background, Data, and Design of Experiments
2.1 Background and Data
Both randomized field experiments for this study were conducted in collaboration with
the microfinance institution Fondo Esperanza (FE), and a large commercial bank, Banco
Credichile. The context of FE is particularly suitable to analyze the role of self-help
peer groups for savings by those outside the formal labor market. The study participants
were microcredit clients of FE, and the savings accounts that were offered were held
with Banco Credichile. FE’s clients are self-employed micro-entrepreneurs (e.g., street
vendors, cosmetic saleswomen), many of whom work in the informal sector. Participants
are typically from the same geographic area but do not work together as each has their
own micro-entreprise. They meet regularly, on a weekly or biweekly basis, in groups of
about 10-20 peers, together with a group supervisor from FE. The purpose of the meetings
is to enforce the regular repayment of the micro-loans that participants receive from FE
in 3-month cycles for investment in their micro-enterprise. This feature allowed us to
incorporate the peer group-based program features and structure.
The participants in this study fall in the lowest of the three tiers of income categoriza-
tions developed by the Central Bank of Chile. Data from a household survey conducted
in 2008 by the central bank finds that 64.5% of those in the lowest income group have
some amount of debt (Gerencia de Investigacion Financiera, 2013).9 Median household
debt for the lowest income group in the central bank survey was 370,000 Chilean pesos,
while the individuals in our sample have a median debt of 264,000 pesos. The amounts
of debt between the two samples are not directly comparable because they are recorded
at the household level in the central bank survey while our data is at the individual level.
Although the fact remains that all participants in our study held some form of debt with
FE, the amounts of total debt suggest that their overall borrowing may not be unusually
high.
9The median household income in the lowest tier is 281,667 Chilean pesos (CLP) compared to 291,734
in our sample.
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Given that our participants are all borrowing from the microfinance organization,
the treatment encourages people to save while borrowing. Simultaneously saving and
borrowing may not be optimal because instead of saving (and receiving a low interest
rate), participants could reduce their debt (which has a higher interest rate). Several
conditions must hold for increased savings to be welfare improving in this setting.10 1) Due
to behavioral or credit market frictions, participants have reasons to lend low and borrow
high. For example, higher liquidity in savings than borrowing could lead households to
keep some precautionary savings while borrowing at the same time; 2) Participants do not
do this optimally on their own prior to the intervention (maybe due to behavioral reasons);
3) Participants are accepting a negative return in order to overcome their behavioral
limitation in saving more; 4) The treatment works to cure under-saving.
We will discuss these conditions in turn. In the end, while some evidence suggests that
additional savings may be beneficial for our population, this has to be interpreted with
caution. Overall, we are agnostic as to whether increased savings are welfare improving
for most participants in our sample.
With respect to whether it is optimal for participants to hold debt and assets at the
same time (condition 1 above), Telyukova (2013) shows that people hold (credit card)
debt and “low return liquid assets” (such as cash in the bank) because of transaction
frictions (see also the evidence in Zinman, 2007). She finds that a substantial fraction
of households keep cash because they anticipate situations where they cannot use their
credit card and will therefore need to access their liquid assets. Whether our participants
face such borrowing frictions is difficult to judge. However, the structure of the loans at
Fondo Esperanza has a very rigid schedule of payments. No extra borrowing in times
of emergencies is possible until the next scheduled round of lending (every three or six
months, depending on the group). As such, participants may want to keep some precau-
tionary savings because they provide households with liquid assets in case of unexpected
need.
Even if it is optimal for our participants to have some savings while borrowing, for
an intervention to be warranted there need to be barriers that prevent participants from
reaching their optimal level on their own (condition 2). The existing evidence indicates
that households are often optimally allocating between savings and debt (see Zinman,
2015, for an excellent review). On the other hand, behavioral factors can also lead to
10We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting these specific conditions.
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under-saving for emergencies – Dupas and Robinson (2013b), for example, find that even
quite basic savings technologies like earmarking can address behavioral issues that previ-
ously prevented participants from saving for health emergencies. We only have suggestive
evidence that our participants had difficulties saving optimally. In the baseline survey,
participants were asked whether there were times in the past three months in which they
regretted not having saved more. Among the options (always, frequently, almost never,
and never) 39% said always, and 29% said frequently. In other words, 68% regretted not
saving more. However, the survey did not ask specifically whether they regretted not
saving more while borrowing from FE. If they would have been asked specifically about
the trade-off, they might have wanted to reduce debt instead of saving more. The only
indication that we have of participants’ views on how they wanted to save more stems
from focus groups prior to treatment. In these qualitative interviews, participants con-
sistently expressed that increasing savings required budgeting changes on other margins.
They stated that they wished to cut down consumption from non-planned expenditures,
particularly temptation goods (e.g., candy on the way to work) so that they could save
more.
Additional suggestive evidence on the question whether participants were already
at their optimal savings level stems from the finding that the treatment had positive
effects in terms of anxiety about participants’ financial future (see section “Are These
Real Additional Savings?”). However, overall we do not have conclusive information on
whether participants were at sub-optimal savings levels prior to the intervention.
To get a sense of the price participants are willing to pay to hold liquid savings while
having debt (condition 3 above), we can ask how costly it is for participants to increase
their savings instead of paying down debt. We calculate how much participants could have
reduced their interest payments if they reduced their debt by the additional savings due
to the treatment. FE charges a 3% monthly interest rate and a one-time 3% fixed fee per
loan cycle. Participants in the Peer Group Treatment would have paid 348 Pesos (about
70 cents) less interest over a three-month lending period had they used their additional
average monthly savings balance (4,050 Pesos) to lower the amount that they borrowed.
The final condition (4) – whether the treatment worked to increase savings – is addressed
by the main results of the paper showing the impact of the Peer Group Treatment on
savings.
This paper draws on three different sources of data. First, information on take-up and
all transactions (i.e., deposits, withdrawals and balances in the accounts) was obtained
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directly from Banco Credichile. Based on the deposit and withdrawal data from Banco
Credichile, we calculated balances (deposits minus withdrawals). In doing so, we did not
add interest rate payments. Since the bank provided this information for all participants,
there is no attrition in the data. The second source of data came from FE’s adminis-
trative files, which include participants’ estimated household size, income, and years of
education. Unfortunately, data on loan size or default rates was not available. Finally,
we complemented these two sources of administrative data with an extensive baseline and
follow-up survey, conducted by the independent survey agency Microdatos. These surveys
include questions about participants’ savings and debt, their economic situation and re-
cent economic difficulties, as well as a number of questions about individuals’ preferences
and self-assessment, such as attitudes towards savings and banks, financial literacy, time
preferences, etc.
The timeline of the interventions was as follows (see Figures 1 and 2 for an illustra-
tion): The baseline survey was conducted in April-May 2008, during one of the group
meetings. The savings accounts for the Peer Group Experiment were introduced soon
after, in June-July 2008. A year later, the follow-up survey was conducted through indi-
vidual interviews at participants’ home or workplace to be able to cover all participants,
including those that had left FE in the meantime. During this follow-up survey, eligible
participants were introduced to the second experiment, the Feedback Message Experi-
ment.
[Figures 1 and 2 about here.]
2.2 Experiment 1: Peer Group and High-Interest Treatments
Design
The Peer Group Experiment analyzes the effect of the self-help Peer Group Treatment
on savings and compares it to a control group as well as a benchmark group with a
substantially higher interest rate. The experiment was conducted among 196 peer groups
with a total of 2,687 clients of the microcredit organization Fondo Esperanza (FE). The
universe of study participants consists of all members of the 196 groups who were present
at the meeting when the baseline survey was conducted.
Participants in all three groups – Control, Peer Group Treatment and High-Interest
Treatment – were offered a savings account. Prior to the introduction of the account,
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a baseline survey was conducted. In the following weeks, peer groups were randomly
assigned to either the control group or one of two treatment groups (see Figure 1 for a
graphical representation of the experimental design). All members within a peer group
were offered the same treatment without learning of the other treatments. The random-
ization was stratified by group supervisor, which automatically led to balance by region
as well. Half of the groups were randomly selected for the Peer Group Treatment, while
the rest were assigned to the high interest rate and the basic account groups in equal
proportion.11
1. Control Group: Participants assigned to the control group received access to a
basic savings account. Information about the savings account was presented in
one of the regular group meetings. Participants could open the account at Banco
Credichile on their own or go to the bank together with their peers. All accounts were
individual. These savings accounts had a real annual interest rate of 0.3% (similar to
the highest standard alternative in the Chilean market). It was attractive compared
to generally available options in the market in that it had no maintenance fee and
no minimum balance, except for a 2-dollar minimum opening deposit. The account
was completely liquid for withdrawals at any time, and the financial conditions were
guaranteed for at least two years.
2. Peer Group Treatment : Participants in the Peer Group Treatment received access
to the same basic bank account as those in the control group. This was accompanied
by the following peer group structure: 1) Group members who opened an account
had the option of announcing a weekly deposit goal for the following three months
to the group;12 2) During the following group meetings, participants checked who
had met their deposit goal, based on deposit slips that participants brought to the
meeting; 3) Those who had met their goal received a sticker in a booklet; 4) Those
who collected enough stickers received a diploma as a non-monetary award. The
stickers assisted in keeping track of progress, but there were no financial incentives
for complying with one’s goal.
3. High-Interest Treatment : Participants in the High-Interest Treatment received ac-
cess to an account that was identical to the basic account, but were offered a 5%
11The design also included a pure control group that received no savings account, used for an impact
evaluation of access to a formal savings account (discussed in Kast and Pomeranz, 2014).
12While it might be of interest to have more information about participant’s savings goals, this data
has not been provided by FE.
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real interest rate. It was explicitly presented as the “Most Profitable Interest in the
Market.” The introduction of the account was accompanied by a one-hour workshop
during the group meeting about the importance of interest rate returns. The high
return was illustrated graphically with a growing piggy bank and a representation
of compounded interest rates.
Summary Statistics
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the 2,687 participants in the sample of the
Peer Group Experiment. As expected, given the random assignment, average characteris-
tics in the three treatment groups are very similar and there are no statistically significant
differences with the exception of group size.
[Table 1 about here.]
Participants in the study are an average of 43 years old and have a mean of 9.7 years
of schooling. Monthly income per capita of their households is 80,519 pesos (about 161
USD), with an average household size of 4.3 people. Sixty-seven percent of participants
did not have a savings account prior to the study.13 Correspondingly, the median of pre-
existing savings was zero, with a mean of 68,980 pesos (while income is expressed in per
capita terms, these savings may combine savings of several household members, especially
including participants’ children). Participants’ reported mean debt, including the micro-
loan from FE, is 287,326 pesos, with a median of 66,000 pesos. The larger amounts of
debt compared to savings is not surprising given that participants are entrepreneurs and
most of their debt is backed up by inventories and future sales. The average number of
participants was 15 per group with a slightly lower average in groups offered the basic
savings account.14
2.3 Experiment 2: Feedback Messages
The Feedback Message Experiment was designed as a follow-up study to the Peer Group
Experiment. Since the Peer Group Treatment consisted of a whole bundle of different,
potentially important elements, the goal of the Feedback Message Experiment was to
13In Chile in general, 40% do not have a bank account (Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt et al., 2008, p. 190).
14The baseline survey was conducted before it was determined which groups were going to be assigned
to which treatment, so we can exclude a selection effect based on the type of the account.
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strip the treatment of several of these aspects. It keeps many things constant, in order
to advance our understanding of what drives the effect and investigate an alternative,
potentially more scalable delivery mechanism.
This second experiment was conducted one year after the Peer Group Experiment
began, soon after the follow-up survey. Eligible participants were randomly assigned to
either the control group or one of two weekly text message service treatments designed
to simulate the regular feedback and follow-up of peer group meetings (see Figure 2 for a
graphical representation of the experimental design).15 All participants, including those
in the control group, were asked to state a purpose for which they wanted to save in
the following three months and to set a weekly savings goal towards that purpose. This
allowed us to keep the goal setting aspect constant across both treatments and control.16
The two treatments were as follows:
1. Treatment 1: Peer Pressure Treatment – Participants chose a person as their “Sav-
ings Buddy” to monitor their performance and encourage them to stick to their
savings goal. Both the participant and the Savings Buddy subsequently received
weekly text messages about whether the participant did or did not make their de-
posit that week and the message reminded participants that the Savings Buddy
received the same information (see Appendix A for exact wording of the messages).
2. Treatment 2: Peer Information Treatment – In the same way as in Treatment 1,
participants received a weekly text message about whether they made their weekly
deposit. However, there was no Savings Buddy involved; only the participant re-
ceived text messages. Instead, participants were informed about the share of other
participants similar to them who made a deposit that week.17
These treatments allow us to hold more things constant than the Peer Group Treat-
ment. There are no stickers, rewards or group meetings, and non-public goal setting is held
15After a welcome text message was sent, participants also got a phone call reminding them that they
will receive weekly text messages.
16With respect to goal setting, Soman and Zhao (2011) find that a single savings goal (e.g., to save for
the education of one child) increased savings substantially compared to having multiple savings goals.
17The design of the Peer Information Treatment in principle also allowed analyzing the impact of
varying quality of peers, by introducing random variation in which peers participants were compared to.
We assigned participants to “comparison” groups in order to create random variation in peer quality.
This makes it possible to test whether participants who are informed about a different level of success of
their peers in their first week of treatment display a different deposit pattern thereafter. However, power
limitations did not allow distinguishing such differential treatment effects.
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constant across treatment and controls. The difference between the two Feedback Message
Treatments relates to the following: Peer groups are often thought to affect behavior by
creating pressure on individuals (e.g. Schelling, 1984).18 Alternatively, Battaglini et al.
(2005) suggest that participants of the Peer Group Treatment may be motivated by ob-
serving the success of others. In addition to the regular feedback, one Feedback Message
Treatment therefore included the aspect of peer pressure – others observing the success
rate of the participant – while the second treatment included the aspect of the participant
observing the success rate of others. However, since both Feedback Message Treatments
serve as reminders as well, we cannot distinguish the impact of the Peer Pressure and
Peer Information treatments from the effect of a pure reminder. It is therefore difficult to
tease out the exact mechanisms that drive the results.
Sample Selection and Set-Up of the Intervention
The sample of the Feedback Message Experiment consisted of the participants who
had opened an account as part of the Peer Group Experiment, of which those who did not
own a cell phone or opted out of the service were excluded. Assignment into the different
treatment arms and control in the Feedback Message Experiment was stratified by treat-
ment group in the Peer Group Experiment.19 This led to a sample of 871 participants
(see below for how those participants differed from the full sample of the Peer Group
Experiment). About half of the participants had previously taken part in the Peer Group
Treatment, and we can test whether the results of the Feedback Message Experiment are
different depending on treatment status in the first experiment.
Prior to administering the follow-up survey, all participants who opened a savings
account during the first experiment were randomly assigned to one of the two treatment
groups or to the control group for the second experiment. The randomization was strat-
ified by savings balance in the study account and by the group to which participants
belonged. The latter automatically assures stratification by treatment in the first exper-
iment. To maximize take-up, a set of screening questions was asked during the survey
to exclude those who did not own a cell phone or were not interested in the weekly text
message service to help them save more.
All participants, including the control group, were asked what their weekly savings
goal would be for the next three months if such a service were offered. Since this question
18For a similar argument about norm adherence, see, e.g., Bernheim (1994) and for image motivation,
see Benabou and Tirole (2006); Ariely et al. (2009).
19See Appendix B for the wording of the screening questions.
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was asked prior to the assignment of treatment and worded exactly the same regardless
of treatment, we can rule out that the effect is driven by the process of goal-setting
itself (see e.g., Locke and Latham, 2006; Hsiaw, 2013). Those assigned to one of the
treatments were then informed that they could indeed receive such a service for free, and
the details of their particular service were explained (without mention of the existence
of other treatments). Since the interviews happened in a staggered manner, different
participants started receiving the service at different points in time. However, the service
ended for everyone at the same time (at the end of October 2009).
Summary Statistics
Table 2 presents summary statistics of the Feedback Message Experiment. As ex-
pected, given the random assignment, average characteristics across treatment groups are
very similar.
[Table 2 about here.]
Similar to the Peer Group Experiment, participants have an average of 9.7 years of
schooling, their mean age is 44 years, and 66% did not have a savings account prior to the
account they opened in the context of this study. The mean monthly per capita income of
participants’ households is 82,636 Chilean pesos (about 165 USD) with a median of 70,000
pesos. The average number of household members is 4.4. The average savings balance
in the study accounts at the beginning of the Feedback Message Experiment is 12,759
pesos and participants made an average of 1.52 deposits and 0.70 withdrawals during the
12 months preceding the Feedback Message Experiment. Participants in the Feedback
Message Experiment are similar along demographic variables to those who were in the
overall sample of the Peer Group Experiment but did not participate in the Feedback
Message Experiment. However, their median income at baseline (prior to any treatment)
is about 5% higher and their median financial debt is about 19% higher (on the other
hand, their mean financial debt is about 23% lower). In addition, they had used the study
account more actively by construction, since only those who had opened an account during
the Peer Group Experiment were included in the Feedback Message Experiment.
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3 The Effect of the Peer Group Treatment on Savings
This section analyzes the effect of the Peer Group Treatment on savings compared to the
control group, which was offered a savings account without the additional goal setting,
monitoring, and rewards program that functioned in the context of the peer groups (“Peer
Group Treatment” thereafter). Figure 3 shows the effect of the Peer Group Treatment on
the monthly number of deposits and average savings balance. It displays the intent-to-
treat (ITT) effect for 12 months starting in August 2008, after the opening period of the
accounts (June-July 2008). It compares those assigned to the Peer Group Treatment to
those assigned to the basic account. The Peer Group Treatment clearly increases savings
both in terms of number of deposits and amount deposited. Panel A shows that the
number of deposits is almost four times higher in the Peer Group Treatment. While the
effect strongly decreases over time, even in the last quarter of the year, the number of
deposits is still over three times higher (0.059 vs. 0.016; p < 0.001).
[Figure 3 about here]
Panel B of Figure 3 shows how the Peer Group Treatment not only increases the
number of deposits but also leads to higher savings balances. The average balance is
twice as high for participants in the Peer Group Treatment as in the control group. The
effect persists over time and does not decrease during the entire year. The fact that
savings increase initially and stay constant afterwards suggests that individuals may have
reached a stable level of savings that they maintain, consistent with a precautionary
savings model. Before building any savings beyond a small buffer stock, it would be in
their interest to first reduce their debt. For this reason, it is expected that the amount
saved will be relatively small in magnitude.
The decrease in the number of deposits over time might also be explained by at
least three other reasons. First, individuals might not continuously participate in the
Peer Group Treatment, for example if they leave FE. Individuals in the Peer Group
Treatment who are still with FE one year after the introduction of the accounts make
more deposits throughout the intervention period. However, this correlation has to be
interpreted with caution since who stayed or left is clearly not exogenous. Second, the FE
group leader and/or participants might lose some of the initial motivation, and the quality
and regularity of the monitoring of savings goals in the meetings might consequently
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decline over time.20 Third, maybe participants shift large amounts from other savings
vehicles to the study account during the initial months. Looking at the share of large
deposits (higher than 25,000 pesos), shows that the share of individuals who made such
large deposits in the first three months is 3.5% in the basic account treatment and 5.4%
in the peer group treatment.
Table 3 shows these results in an OLS framework.21 We estimate regressions of the
following specification:
Si = α + β1Self Helpi + β2Interest Ratei + i (1)
Si is the savings outcome for individual i. We analyze three savings outcomes, start-
ing in August 2008: (1) the number of deposits over 12 months, (2) the total amount
deposited, and (3) the average monthly balance. In order to illustrate the effect of out-
liers, we also show the results for a sample that is winsorized at top 1% and top 5%.22
Self Help is a dummy equal to one for individuals in the Peer Group Treatment and
Interest Rate is a dummy equal to one for those in the High-Interest Treatment.  is
the error term. This section focuses on the analysis for the Peer Group Treatment, com-
pared to the basic account. Section 5, below, compares these effects to the results for the
High-Interest Treatment as a benchmark.
Panel A of Table 3 presents the intent-to-treat (ITT) effect for all three outcomes.
The ITT effects support the findings of Figure 3: the number of deposits, the amount
deposited, and the savings balance are significantly higher for those in the Peer Group
Treatment. Panel B shows treatment-on-the-treated (TOT) effects. For the purposes of
20Group leaders were trained to conduct the activities for the Peer Group Treatment during the group
meetings. We cannot measure to what degree these activities were followed through more intensely in the
first few months since we have insufficient information on how the weekly meetings proceeded. A reduction
in intensity of the actual treatment over time is consistent with the fact that savings drop off after the first
few months in the Peer Group Experiment but remain more constant in the Feedback Message Treatment
(see Figures 3 and 4). It is also possible that at the start of the program participants were more diligent
at actively participating. At the end of the Peer Group Experiment, we asked participants about the
implementation of the group activities (see Appendix Table A1). The majority of respondents reported
that the group leader motivated the group to save and used the form to track progress in every meeting
and that nobody received a sticker without showing proof of deposit with a deposit slip. Awards were
distributed in about half the groups. However, this does not give us any indication about the dynamics
over time.
21Tobit specifications do not change the results qualitatively.
22The winzorized dataset sets the top 1% and 5% of the observations, respectively, to the 99th and
95th percentile value using the entire dataset, including the period of the first and second experiment
combined.
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this specification, we consider participants to be “treated” if they opened a study account
and made at least one deposit. We do not have data on who elected to actively participate
in the group treatment by publicly announcing their savings goal and progress. Since some
participants may not have participated in the peer-related activities, these TOT effects
provide a lower bound on the impact of these activities. Take-up rates of the savings
accounts are very similar across the three treatments. 49.7% of participants opened an
account among those offered the basic account, 54.7% among those in groups assigned to
the Peer Group Treatment, and 50.7% among those offered the high interest rate account
(the differences are not statistically significant). Correspondingly, Panel B shows that the
TOT effects are about twice the size of the ITT effects.
[Table 3 about here.]
These effects are both statistically and economically significant, as the number of
deposits increases 6-fold and the average savings balances almost triple. The TOT increase
in total amount deposited over the course of a year of 25,937 pesos represents about
32% of mean monthly per capita income and corresponds in size to the precautionary
savings goal mentioned in the focus groups. The increase in the number of deposits by
1.5 masks a substantial heterogeneity among participants: 53.5% of participants in the
Peer Group Treatment who opened an account made zero deposits beyond the minimum
opening amount in the entire year, while 5.4% made at least 10 deposits over the year.23
To put our results in perspective, Dupas and Robinson (2013b) test the effect of social
pressure on savings in their Health Pot treatment. In a ROSCA (Rotating Savings and
Credit Association) setting, participants could make contributions to a side pot that could
only be used for health expenditures. Through the ROSCA mechanism, there was social
pressure and all but the last member received the health product earlier than if they had
saved individually (i.e., they got credit). The Health Pot increased savings by 128-138
percent.
In sum, the evidence indicates that the Peer Group Treatment is effective at encour-
aging deposits, which in turn leads to increased savings balances. The increased number
23Evidence from e.g. Ashraf et al. (2006b) and Meier and Sprenger (2010) suggests that individuals
who exhibit time-inconsistent preferences might benefit particularly from financial commitment devices.
In our context, the Peer Group Treatment led to front-loading of the cost of not saving, which may have a
particularly strong effect on those with time-inconsistent preferences. Table A2 in the Appendix explores
differential treatment effects along this category, and the evidence indeed suggests that the treatment
might be particularly effective for those with time-inconsistent preferences.
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of deposits is not offset by a corresponding increase in withdrawals, even though the
accounts are fully liquid and withdrawals are not observable by the peers.
Are These Real Additional Savings?
Having found that the Peer Group Treatment doubles savings in the study account,
it is important to ask whether this constitutes additional savings or just crowds out other
forms of savings. Generally, it is very difficult to obtain evidence on this question since
researchers usually only have information about one savings vehicle, and survey data on
total savings tends to be very noisy. Keeping this caveat in mind, most previous studies
that tested for this found no evidence of crowd-out, or even some evidence for crowding
in (e.g. Ashraf et al., 2006b; Gelber, 2011; Prina, 2012; Dupas and Robinson, 2013a,b).
Chetty et al. (2013) find that nudges such as automatic contributions by employers do not
crowd out retirement savings. In contrast, a tax subsidy as a financial incentive for savings
crowds out other savings almost one-to-one. However, in our case, we cannot conclusively
demonstrate that the savings constitute additional savings, we can only provide a number
of suggestive facts.
First, for the 67% of participants that did not have another savings account, savings
in the study account represents all new formal savings. To look at all forms of savings,
including informal savings, we use data from the follow-up survey. However, this data
is very noisy and does not allow for strong conclusions.24 Correspondingly, none of the
following results are statistically significant. Anticipating the noisiness of self-reported
amounts, we also elicited a binary measure where participants indicated whether they
made deposits or withdrawals from any other account in the previous six months. This
measure is less noisy since it is easier for participants to remember than exact amounts.25
Columns (1) and (2) of Table A3 in the Appendix show that those in the Peer Group
Treatment are not less likely to use other accounts, both in terms of deposits and with-
drawals. Columns (3)-(5) show the results on total formal savings (Panel A) and overall
24To get a sense of how noisy the self-reported information is, we compare the self-reported amount for
the study account with the correct amount in the account, which we know from administrative data, and
find a correlation of merely 0.43. It is also surprising that many individuals indicate that they do not
have money in any form. For example, 58% indicate that they do not have any money saved at home or
in their business. The results of this section changed somewhat compared to previous versions, since we
realized while doing robustness checks that some of the very large amounts, which led to noisy estimates,
were in fact data entry errors and had to be coded as missing.
25Confirming the validity of this measure, we test whether participants in the Peer Group Treatment
reported a higher probability of having made a deposit into the study account, which we know from the
administrative data to be true, and find that this is indeed the case (p < 0.01).
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savings (Panel B) for varying degrees of winsorizing. Again, none of the effects are sta-
tistically significant. Finally, Table A4 in the Appendix shows a similar picture for the
effects on each components of overall savings.
A second indicator on whether the study account has real impacts and does not only
replace other savings stems from evidence in Kast and Pomeranz (2014). That paper
analyzes the impact of access to any of the study accounts compared to a control group,
which was not offered any account. Having access to a study account helps participants
alleviate the burden of economic shocks, both objectively and subjectively. After one year,
participants with access to the study accounts have 24% fewer outstanding payments to
service providers (p < 0.01) and 37% fewer outstanding payments to family and friends
(p < 0.05). Furthermore, their need to cut back consumption in times of economic
difficulty is reduced by 44% (p < 0.05).26 Subjectively, they report being significantly
less anxious about their financial future, and evaluate their recent economic situation as
less severe. The magnitudes of these subjective improvements correspond in size to more
than half of the change in these measures associated with a job loss or severe business
downturn.
The study lacks the statistical power to make very precise statements about the
impact of the Peer Group Treatment compared to the other two accounts. Looking
at whether the probability of borrowing decreased more for those in the Peer Group
Treatment than for those in the High-Interest or basic account groups, there are no large
or statistically significant differences (see Table A5 in the Appendix).27 In addition, the
paper finds that the improvements in anxiety about the financial future are significantly
stronger (p < 0.05) for individuals in the Peer Group Treatment than for those with access
to the basic or high-interest account.28 Taken together, this evidence suggests that the
26While it would be helpful to detect where the additional savings come from, we do not have detailed
consumption or revenue data to measure this. We only have information on three specific types of bulky
expenditures (home improvements, electronic appliances and business investments). These categories are
not significantly affected by the treatment. Similarly, there are no significant effects on the probability
of taking on extra work to deal with economic difficulties or the number of people contributing to the
household income.
27We do not have information about FE loan repayment. We also do not have data on borrowing
outcomes following the Feedback Message Experiment, so we cannot speculate as to whether savings in
the Feedback Message Experiment came from decreased borrowing.
28Please see Kast and Pomeranz (2014) for details and a full discussion of the different outcome variables
and the problem of multiple hypothesis testing. In addition to “anxiety about financial future” the follow-
up survey included an additional subjective well-being measure about “recent economic difficulty” for
which we do not find a statistically significant effect. This null result might be expected given that
participants saved more in the recent past, but we should nevertheless keep in mind that only one of the
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savings in our study do not seem to be mere substitution.
4 How Crucial are Meetings and Peer Pressure?
The previous section established that the Peer Group Treatment is effective at increasing
savings. As mentioned above, the Peer Group Treatment consisted of a whole bundle
of interventions including goal-setting, public monitoring, rewards, and observing others
save, and cannot distinguish between the effects of these components. It is important to
unpack some of these mechanisms to learn which elements are required for the effectiveness
of the treatment (Ludwig et al., 2011). In so doing, we may shed light on alternative ways
to deliver the service that the Peer Group Treatment provides. This section therefore
makes a step towards distinguishing some of these elements. We first analyze whether
in-person meetings (and all related activities such as distribution of stickers, diplomas,
and moral support) are required, by testing the effectiveness of regular feedback and
follow-up in “synthetic” peer groups through text messages. We then investigate whether
peer pressure is the driving force by comparing two different types of Feedback Message
Treatments – peer pressure text messages via a Savings Buddy vs. peer information text
messages.
The Effect of Feedback Text Messages on Savings
Figure 4 shows the impact of being offered the weekly text message feedback service
(either treatment 1 or treatment 2). The horizontal axis represents months since the
treatment began in the year 2009, and the area between the vertical lines marks the
period during which the text message intervention was implemented (called “intervention
period” going forward). Panel A shows the number of deposits per month, and Panel B
shows the amount deposited.
[Figure 4 about here]
Figure 4 reveals three important points. First, there is no significant difference be-
tween treatment (either kind of text message) and control groups in both panels before the
experiment begins in August 2009 (month “1” in the figure). Deposits in June and July
two subjective measures was significantly affected.
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trend slightly downward in the cold winter months in Chile, but this trend is no different
between treatment and control. Second, during the intervention period, savings outcomes
are substantially higher in the treatment compared to the control group, almost tripling
the number of weekly deposits. The amounts deposited are more noisy, but even there we
see a substantial increase. Third, after the text messages stop, the savings behavior looks
very similar again across groups, and we observe no long-run impact on savings habits.
Also, in contrast to the Peer Group Treatment, the effect of the text messages does
not seem to decay over the three treatment months. This might be due to the fact that the
default with respect to continuing participation is different: In order to stop participating
in the text message service, individuals would have to actively opt out, while for the Peer
Group Treatment to continue, participants have to actively opt in each week by attending
the meeting. The effect of text messages might therefore be more sustainable over time.
Future research is required to test the effectiveness of the messages over the long run.
In order to estimate the significance of the treatment effects, we ran regressions of
the following form:
Si = α + β1Treatmenti + Prior Savingsi + i (2)
where Si is the savings outcome for individual i, and Treatment is a dummy vari-
able equal to one for individuals in the treatment groups. In addition, we control for
the amount saved prior to the intervention period, which reduces much of the noise by
capturing individual-specific variation, similar to what would be the case in a difference-
in-difference specification.29 We use the following measures of Si: (1) total number of
deposits, (2) total amount deposited, (3) net new savings (deposits − withdrawals), and
(4) average monthly balance. All these outcomes are measured between August and Oc-
tober 2009, the duration of the Feedback Message Experiment. Amounts are also shown
winsorized at the top 1% and 5% for strictly non-negative variables, and at the top and
bottom 1% and 5% for other variables.
Table 4 presents the results for all four outcomes during the intervention period.
Panel A shows intent-to-treat (ITT) and Panel B treatment-on-the-treated (TOT) ef-
fects.30 The feedback text messages have a substantial effect on savings. In the ITT
29Results without controlling for prior balance (shown in Table A6 in the Appendix) are qualitatively
similar but measured more imprecisely.
30Since the treatments are stratified across groups, clustering standard errors at the group level does
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specification, the average number of deposits is almost three times that of the control
group, and the amount deposited is 6,000 pesos higher. Overall, participants in the treat-
ment group increase their net new savings in the intervention period by about 7,800 pesos
and their average monthly savings balance by about 9,000 pesos.31 Take-up rates of the
two treatments are very similar. Of participants who initially express interest in the ser-
vice, 41.4% end up signing up when offered the Peer Pressure service and 42.5% when
offered the Peer Information service.32 Correspondingly, the TOT effects are somewhat
more than double in size, increasing amounts deposited 6-fold in the full sample and 3.5-
fold in the winsorized sample. To put these numbers in perspective, Karlan et al. (2016)
find that in a pooled sample from Peru, Bolivia and the Philippines, simple monthly
savings reminders increased savings by 6%.
[Table 4 about here.]
With respect to the relationship of the Feedback Message Experiment to the pre-
ceding Peer Group Experiment, two questions arise. 1) Is there an interaction effect of
having been in the Peer Group Treatment on the effectiveness of the Feedback Message
Treatment? 2) How do the magnitudes of the Peer Group and Feedback Message Treat-
ments compare? Given the random assignment in both experiments, we can test the first
question directly (see Table A7 in the Appendix). Analysis of the interaction between the
treatments in the two experiments shows no significant effect of having been in the Peer
Group Treatment on take-up or effectiveness of the Feedback Message Treatments. How-
ever, the estimates are not precise and we cannot rule out that the Peer Group Treatment
affected the response to the Feedback Message Treatment.33 With respect to the second
question, comparison of the treatment effects between the two experiments (Peer Group
Treatment versus feedback messages) clearly has to be interpreted with much caution,
not affect the results.
31The coefficient on prior savings is positive for number of deposits, amount deposited and average
monthly balance as participants who saved more before are more likely to save and have higher balances.
The coefficient is, however, negative for net new savings since mechanically, people who have prior savings
can withdraw more in the intervention period, leading to possible negative new savings.
32Take-up was not significantly different for those who had previously received the Peer Group Treat-
ment than for those who had received the basic account (39.0% vs. 35.4% respectively). Take-up was
highest (53.5%) among those in the High-Interest Treatment.
33We can also look at how overall prior savings behavior correlates with the treatment effect in the
Feedback Message Experiment. Table A8 in the Appendix shows that the Feedback Message Treatments
have a larger effect on individuals who had made more prior deposits and deposited higher amounts. It
is of course endogenous who saved more prior to the Feedback Message Experiment, so these correlations
have to be interpreted with some caution.
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since it is not based on random assignment. The treatment happens in a different year,
to a different subsample of participants, and over a different length of time. However, a
back-of-the-envelope calculation allows us to get some sense of how much of the effect of
the Peer Group Treatment can be achieved without physical meetings.
First, we need to take into account that participants in the Feedback Message Ex-
periment are a non-random subsample of the Peer Group Experiment. We therefore
recalculate the effect of the Peer Group Treatment among only those 871 participants.
To further increase comparability, we hold the duration constant and focus on the initial
period, when the Peer Group Treatment had the strongest effect. This stacks the odds
in favor of the Peer Group Treatment, and therefore provides a conservative estimate for
the hypothesis that the physical meeting component of the Peer Group Treatment is less
important than expected. It also has the advantage of controlling for seasonal effects,
since it compares savings in the same calendar months one year apart. Table A9 in the
Appendix shows this specification and indicates a treatment effect of 10,275 pesos for the
Peer Group Treatment among this sample.
Finally, TOT and ITT for the Peer Group Experiment are by construction identical in
this sample, since all participants in the Feedback Message Experiment opened a savings
account in the scope of the Peer Group Experiment. For a conservative comparison, we
therefore compare it with the ITT effect of the Feedback Message Experiment in Table 4,
where savings increase by about 7,800 pesos.34 This back-of-the-envelope calculation
suggests that feedback text messages can achieve 75% or more of the effect of the Peer
Group Treatment in terms of new savings balance, and implies that physical meetings
might not be as central to the effect of the Peer Group Treatment as previously thought.
In sum, feedback text messages provide an alternative delivery mechanism to the
Peer Group Treatment that has a substantial effect on savings and is potentially more
scalable. They strip the bundle of interventions used in the Peer Group Treatment of
many elements and thereby provide a first step towards understanding the underlying
mechanisms.
Is Peer Pressure Required for the Effectiveness?
The previous section established that feedback text messages can achieve substan-
34If we choose the specification that does not control for prior balance, shown in Table A6, then the
benchmark effect of the text messages is even higher, at 10,275 pesos.
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tial increases in savings rates without actual in-person meetings like in the Peer Group
Treatment. This section investigates whether the effect can also be achieved without peer
pressure, by comparing the two types of Feedback Message Treatments (see Section 2 for
a description of their design).
Figure 5 shows the ITT effect of the Peer Pressure Treatment compared to both
the control group and the Peer Information Treatment. The savings behavior in the two
treatments follows a very similar pattern, both in terms of the number of deposits per
month (Panel A) and in terms of amount deposited (Panel B).
[Figure 5 about here.]
Table 5 confirms this impression with regressions, showing the results for the two
treatments separately. Both treatments independently increase deposits compared to the
control group. Net new savings increase significantly for the Peer Information treatment,
but not the Peer Pressure treatment. The difference between the two text message treat-
ments is not statistically significant for any of the specifications and outcomes.
[Table 5 about here.]
What we can conclude from this experiment is that feedback text messages can be
highly effective even without the Savings Buddy and that peer pressure is not required.
The fact that the Peer Pressure and Peer Information Treatment have similar effects
suggests that it may be the regular feedback and reminder effect of the messages that
is driving the results. However, to test this hypothesis rigorously, further research is re-
quired. In particular, it would be interesting to compare the effectiveness of Peer Pressure
and Peer Information messages to simple feedback messages and pure reminder messages
to disentangle the various potential mechanisms.
The fact that the Peer Pressure Treatment does not lead to stronger effects is even
more striking in light of a) the kind of person participants chose as their Savings Buddy
and b) the information contained in the Peer Information messages.
a) When signing up for the text message service, participants in the Peer Pressure
Treatment indicated their relationship to the Savings Buddy and the main reason they
chose that person. Participants were allowed to select their own Savings Buddy so that
they could choose their “optimal” peer. The reasons given for choosing that particular
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person indeed indicate that participants are using the text message services as a form of
peer pressure and select Savings Buddies who genuinely hold them accountable. The most
frequently stated reason (31%) is that the person chosen is very strict and will motivate
the participants to comply with their savings goal (see Table A10 in the Appendix).
This is followed by 29% indicating that the person was chosen because the participant
generally shares financial information with them; 19% because the person is a role model
when it comes to saving, by being very organized and good at complying with his or
her own savings goals; and 12% because the participant shares a bank account with that
person. Very few participants (5%) indicate that they chose their Savings Buddy for
being a relaxed person who would be understanding if the participant could not reach
their savings goal.
In terms of their relationship to their Savings Buddy, participants tend to choose
someone who is close to them, either a close relative or a close friend. The most common
choice is a son or daughter (33%), followed by partner (25%), close friend (17%), other
relative (14%), parent (5%), neighbor (2%), and someone else (3%). According to Mas
and Moretti (2009), peer pressure can be expected to be particularly strong if the peers
know each other, have had past interactions, and expect future interaction. Similarly,
research by Ferrara (2003) and Karlan (2007) shows that in peer lending groups, close
social connections can reduce default. This would suggest that the selected peers should
be particularly effective. However, we cannot rule out that in our context, the optimal
social distance is different, for example if close peers are too understanding when a goal
is not reached and therefore less likely to exert pressure.
b) One possible explanation for why the Peer Pressure Treatment does not have
a stronger effect than the Peer Information Treatment could be that the peer pressure
effect is strong, but the effect of the information about the performance of others is
equally strong. While we cannot rule out that this could be the case, the nature of the
information that was conveyed suggests that this is not very likely. The message in the
Peer Information Treatment (see text in Appendix A) informs participants about the
percentage of others similar to them that made a deposit in a given week. It turns out
that in most weeks, that number is very low or even zero. On average, they are informed
that 6% of their peers made a deposit in a given week, and this share ranges from 0 to
20% depending on the week and their assigned comparison group. This fact, combined
with evidence from Beshears et al. (2015) showing that such information may have very
limited effects on savings, suggests that the peer information component is not very likely
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to have had a strong effect.
In sum, we find that feedback text messages are effective even without a Savings
Buddy and that peer pressure is not required. This is important as peer information
text messages are less cumbersome to implement and scale. It also avoids the potential
disutility from social pressure, which can make participants potentially worse off (e.g.,
DellaVigna et al., 2012). In further research, it would be interesting to explore the specific
mechanisms driving the effectiveness of the feedback messages.
5 Benchmarking the Effect of Peer Groups against
that of a High Interest Rate
The results so far show that the Peer Group Treatment can be a powerful tool to increase
savings – even if the mechanism might be more due to feedback and follow-up than
through peer pressure. We now compare this behavioral intervention to a more traditional
incentive to increase savings, an increased interest rate. This section compares the effect of
the Peer Group Treatment to the High-Interest Treatment in which the real interest rate
was increased to 5% annually, instead of the 0.3% in the basic and peer group accounts.
In addition to serving as a benchmark for the Peer Group Treatment, the High-
Interest Treatment allows us to test the impact of the interest rate on savings. This
setting provides a particularly strong test since, in the context of this experiment, the
higher interest rate was made exceptionally salient, including an entire training session
that elaborated this point (see Section 2).
While, from a theoretical perspective, an argument could be made that the overall
effect of interest rates on savings is ambiguous, due to the income effect that could poten-
tially dominate the substitution effect,35 the prediction on the substitution effect is clear:
In the absence of significant transaction costs, individuals should reallocate their savings
portfolio towards the higher-return account. In our setting, we have the ability not only
to look at the overall effect of the interest rate on savings, but also at whether partici-
pants who had pre-existing savings move them to the high-interest account. Since the 5%
interest rate is higher than anything else offered in the market for these populations, we
35In practice, the income effect is likely to be less important for shorter-term precautionary savings,
such as those in this study.
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expect that their pre-existing savings have a lower return. If the interest rate does not
lead to such reallocation of the savings portfolio to the account with the highest return,
policies and theories based on the premise that the interest rate is an effective tool to
steer savings may have to be called into question to some degree, at least for this type of
population.
[Figure 6 about here]
Figure 6 shows the mean monthly savings balance as well as the 75th, 95th, and
99th percentiles.36 Looking at the mean, it is not readily apparent whether the savings
balance differs between the High-Interest Treatment and either the Peer Group Treatment
or the basic account. However, Panels B-D show that looking at the whole distribution
reveals a much starker result. The vast majority of participants do not respond to the
increased interest rate at all. At the 75th and even at the 95th percentile, the savings
balance in the basic account and the High-Interest Treatment are virtually identical, while
participants in the Peer Group Treatment display substantially higher savings. Only at
the very top of the distribution (Panel D for the 99th percentile) does the interest rate
lead to higher savings. In sum, Figure 6 indicates that the Peer Group Treatment shifts
the entire distribution of savings, while the increased interest rate only affects the very
top tail of the savings distribution.
The results of Table 3 support those findings in regressions for all three of our sav-
ings outcomes. The Peer Group Treatment not only leads to a much bigger increase
in the number of deposits than the High-Interest Treatment, but also to a substantially
higher balance. The treatment effect on the balance is almost twice as large overall (but
measured with substantial noise), and almost eight times larger when we winsorize the
top 5% (measured more precisely). Consistent with the graphical evidence above, the
difference is statistically significant in the winsorized specifications but insignificant in
the non-winsorized specification. Overall, this suggests that while we cannot draw precise
conclusions on the highest amounts, for amounts below the 95th percentile the effects of
the interest rate seem to be small. If we take the non-winsorized results from Column
(5) and linearly extrapolate the point estimation of the interest rate increase, the results
suggest that the Peer Group Treatment has an effect equivalent to an increase in the
interest rate of 7.8%.
36The median is zero, given that take-up is only about 50%.
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The fact that an increase in the interest rate of almost five percentage points does
not appear to increase savings for most participants is noteworthy. We next investigate
whether those participants who had substantial pre-existing savings reallocate them to the
higher-yield account. When asked in the follow-up survey, less than 1% indicate having
made any transfers from a pre-existing account into their study account. Since for small
amounts of savings, the transaction costs may be too large to warrant reallocation, we
also split the group of those with pre-existing accounts further in two, and focus on those
with above-median pre-existing balance. Interestingly, even these “high pre-treatment
savers” do not shift their savings towards the high-interest account. While their average
balance in the pre-existing accounts is about 342,000 pesos (or about 700 USD), their
savings in the study accounts are only about 14,000 pesos.37
There are many potential explanations: tangible or mental costs associated with
this transaction, limited liquidity of the alternative account, a lack of understanding of
the interest rate, mental accounting, or reasons other than the interest rate that lead
participants to prefer the alternative bank account. Determining the specific reasons goes
beyond the scope of this paper. However, we elicited some qualitative information through
a series of detailed questions in the follow-up survey about the motives for moving or not
moving money from other accounts.
Two aspects stand out in the survey responses: a lack of understanding of the interest
rate and mental accounting (Thaler, 1990). Concerning the former, only 5% of partici-
pants indicate knowing the interest rate in their other account. Despite that, 63% of those
in the High-Interest Treatment claim that their other savings account has a higher interest
rate which, as discussed above, is highly unlikely. Such a lack of knowledge about the
high interest rate in the account is surprising, particularly given that participants were
made aware in several ways when the accounts were introduced that the high-interest
account offered the highest return in the market. As mentioned above, participants were
informed about this high return through a pamphlet that included text and illustrations
of a growing piggy bank to emphasize the degree to which compounding increases sav-
ings. The pamphlet was tested with a similar population to make sure that it was easy
to understand. Additionally, the research manager was present in many of the training
sessions and found that the training was executed well.
Despite the explicit training about interest rates upon introduction of the High-
37Similarly, but less surprisingly, we do not observe a shift for those with below-median pre-existing
savings. Their average balance is 34,000 pesos in the pre-existing account and 7,000 in the study account.
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Interest Treatment, the illustrative brochure and the name of the high-interest account
(“Most Profitable Interest in the Market”), it is still possible that the treatment was not
effective in communicating the high interest feature (similarly to the limited effect many
financial education programs have in the U.S., as shown by Lusardi and Mitchell, 2014).
While there is some suggestive indication that financial literacy interacted with the High-
Interest Treatment,38 it is also possible that that interest rate does not significantly impact
the demand for savings. This would be in line with the results of Karlan and Zinman
(2014) who find in a study in the Philippines that savings did not respond significantly
to the interest rate of savings accounts, suggesting that the interest rate may not be very
important to this type of saving.
When participants are asked directly for their reasons not to transfer money from
their other account into the high-interest account, mental accounting stands out. After
soliciting information from participants about the characteristics of the two accounts
(with respect to the interest rate, distance, withdrawal restrictions, trust in the bank,
friendliness of bank staff, and understandability of the account conditions), we asked
those who had another account to categorize a list of potential reasons, in terms of their
importance for not making any transfers. As seen in Table A11, mental accounting is
named as very important by far the most frequently.
In sum, the comparison between the Peer Group Treatment and the High-Interest
Treatment suggests that a behavioral intervention is more effective in this setting in that
it increases savings for a much larger part of the population than increasing the financial
incentives to save. In addition, even participants who have pre-existing formal savings
with lower rates of return do not reallocate their savings to the higher-return account,
suggesting a very limited role of the interest rate for savings decisions. However, given
the substantial level of noise in the non-winsorized null result, this evidence is mostly
suggestive.
38For individuals who either have an above-median score in a financial literacy test (we use three
financial literacy questions similar to the ones used in, e.g., Banks and Oldfield, 2007; Gerardi et al.,
2013) or above-median education, the High-Interest Treatment leads to statistically significantly higher
savings, while for the rest of the sample it does not.
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6 Discussion and Conclusion
Peer groups are often used as a way to achieve personal goals, but there has been lit-
tle empirical evidence evaluating their effectiveness and analyzing what aspects of these
groups lead to their success. Our findings that the Peer Group Treatment increases the
number of deposits 3.7-fold, and almost double the average savings balance after a year,
show that the Peer Group Treatment can be a powerful tool to help participants reach an
individual but mutually shared goal. Beyond savings, this mechanism is applicable for a
wide area of self-control problems.
The Peer Group Treatment may be particularly effective in areas where a small
behavior change can generate a large impact. This is for example the case in our context
of precautionary savings where the relatively small magnitudes in dollar amounts (about
15 USD) can have large implications for participants’ quality of life. The income stream
of these populations is not only low, but also highly volatile. Correspondingly, prior to
the intervention, many participants expressed the desire to build a buffer stock against
economic shocks, and frustration about their inability to do so on their own. This can
have large implications since having a small cushion on the side can, for example, make the
difference between paying the utility bill or sleeping in the cold during the freezing Chilean
winter.39 However, in the context of this study, it is unclear whether the treatment is
welfare improving for this population since they are saving and borrowing at the same
time.
Adding a savings peer group component is especially convenient in contexts where
people meet regularly anyway, such as microfinance groups, schools, sports clubs, or
churches. The Feedback Message Experiment suggests that even outside of such contexts,
savings can be strongly increased through simple feedback messages. While the various
aspects of the Peer Group Treatment can be cumbersome to set up and to maintain,
text message services require little coordination and do not rely on physical proximity,
making them more broadly applicable. Given the astonishing growth rate of cell phone
use worldwide, this is a channel that can potentially reach millions of people and may be
attractive to a wider and different population than those who are willing to come together
for regular meetings.
In addition, the Feedback Message Experiment makes a first step towards disen-
39In line with this, Kast and Pomeranz (2014) find that after one year, participants in the Peer Group
Treatment are significantly less anxious about their financial future.
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tangling the mechanism of the Peer Group Treatment. The fact that regular feedback
messages increase savings without physical meetings and without a Savings Buddy that
observes participants’ behavior suggests that other mechanisms are at play.
First, the results may point to the hypothesis that rather than exerting pressure,
participants may simply provide a mutual service to regularly hold each other accountable.
Just the virtual presence of a peer group combined with feedback regarding savings may
provide the motivation to increase savings. Second, the text messages may simply serve
as reminders – perhaps limited attention plays a role and weekly reminders work to
bring participants’ attention to saving. This may function independently of whether
participants are provided information about a peer group. Third, habit formation may
lead to increased savings. In combination with limited attention, peer groups and feedback
messages could start a habit of savings. The fact that saving levels go back to the level of
the control group once the text messages stop, however, points to relatively weak habit
formation.
This raises at least four additional research questions: 1) How important is the
feedback element, and would simple reminders Karlan et al. (2016) have a similar effect?
2) Could other types of Savings Buddies than the ones chosen by the participants (e.g.,
in terms of social distance, personality traits, etc.) be more effective at holding them
accountable? 3) Does the peer information have a motivational effect after all, despite
the fact that participants are informed that only few others are making a deposit each
week? 4) How generalizable are these findings to other settings?
Beyond the issue of savings, feedback and follow-up through text messages have
many potential applications in other areas where people make resolutions but find it dif-
ficult to follow through, such as preventive health measures (e.g., for diabetes, exercising,
or vaccinations), environmentally-friendly behavior (e.g., saving energy), education (e.g.,
completing homework, solving math exercises), etc. As these methods find wider applica-
tion, the question arises to what degree multiple feedback messages crowd out attention,
and further research is required to investigate interactions between multiple messages, as
well as the effect of feedback messages over a longer time period.
The analysis of the interest rate serves as a benchmark for the effectiveness of the
Peer Group Treatment. In addition, the absence of an effect of the interest rate for
most participants is of interest by itself. While further research is needed to investigate
the interest rate sensitivity of savings in different contexts and for different populations,
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the result suggests that some caution is warranted in the use of policies or economic
models that assume large shares of the population will respond to changes in the interest
rate. At the same time, it is important to keep in mind that the result of the overall
mean response to the increased interest rate is measured with substantial noise in the
non-winsorized specification.
Finally, our results speak to a larger point about behavioral interventions versus finan-
cial incentives to affect behavior. A growing pattern of evidence shows the importance of
social incentives (e.g., Bandiera et al., 2010; Barankay, 2010; Gneezy and Rey-Biel, 2014)
and surprisingly limited effects of monetary rewards, even for financial decisions (e.g.,
Choi et al., 2010; Gneezy et al., 2011; Karlan and Zinman, 2014). Our finding of strong
effects of the Peer Group Treatment and suggestive evidence from the feedback messages,
compared to the limited effectiveness of the interest rate, fits into this pattern. This is
consistent with a new and rapidly growing literature that uses field experiments to directly
compare social and behavioral interventions with financial incentives (e.g., Bertrand et al.,
2010; Ashraf et al., 2012; Chetty et al., 2013). While traditional economic incentives may
be effective in contexts where individuals lack motivation, they may have limited impact
if the constraint that impedes the behavior change lies elsewhere.40 Implementing be-
havior change can be challenging, even for motivated individuals – either psychologically,
due for example to self-control problems, or practically, due for example to complicated
processes. In these situations, policies that facilitate compliance may be more effective
than policies that further increase incentives.
40We thank Brigitte Madrian for helpful discussions, which allowed us to see our findings in this light.
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Figure 1: Peer Group Experiment Design and Timeline
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Figure 2: Feedback Message Experiment Design and Timeline
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Figure 3: Effect of the Peer Group Treatment on Savings (Experiment 1)
Notes: Panel A shows the number of deposits in a given month. Panel B shows the average balance in
the study accounts. “Month” indicates the months since the start of the experiment. All amounts are in
Chilean pesos. 500 pesos = approximately 1 USD.
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Figure 4: Effect of Feedback Text Messages on Savings (Experiment 2)
Notes: Panel A shows the monthly number of deposits and Panel B the amount deposited, winsorized
at the top 5%. The experiment started in August (month 1) and ended in October 2009 (month 3). All
amounts are in Chilean pesos. 500 pesos = approximately 1 USD.
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Figure 5: Impact of Peer Pressure through a Savings Buddy (Experiment 2)
Notes: Panel A shows the monthly number of deposits and Panel B the amount deposited, winsorized
at the top 5%. The experiment started in August (month 1) and ended in October 2009 (month 3). All
amounts are in Chilean pesos. 500 pesos = approximately 1 USD.
44
0
50
00
10
00
0
15
00
0
A
m
ou
nt
 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
 
Month
Basic Account
Self-Help Peer Groups
High Interest Rate
Panel A: Balance
10
00
35
00
60
00
A
m
ou
nt
 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
 
Month
Basic Account
Self-Help Peer Groups
High Interest Rate
Panel B: Balance (75th Percentile)
50
00
25
00
0
45
00
0
A
m
ou
nt
 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
 
Month
Basic Account
Self-Help Peer Groups
High Interest Rate
Panel C: Balance (95th Percentile)
50
00
0
25
00
00
45
00
00
A
m
ou
nt
 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
 
Month
Basic Account
Self-Help Peer Groups
High Interest Rate
Panel D: Balance (99th Percentile)
Figure 6: Effect of Peer Group Treatment and High Interest (Experiment 1)
Notes: Panel A shows the average balance in the study accounts. Panels B, C and D show the 75th, 95th
and 99th percentile, respectively. “Month” indicates the months since the start of the experiment. All
amounts are in Chilean pesos. 500 pesos = approximately 1 USD.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics and Balance of Randomization (Peer Group Experiment)
Variable: All Difference Peer Difference High
Accounts Control Group and Control Interest and Control
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Education 9.65 9.59 0.06 0.13
(3.06) (3.01) (0.15) (0.18)
Age 43.39 43.49 0.10 -0.64
(11.58) (11.70) (0.57) (0.66)
Income per capita (monthly) 80,519 80,187 335 615
(58,901) (55,308) (2,924) (3,395)
[67,375] [67,167] [1,167] [-1,000]
Household size 4.33 4.42 -0.14 -0.07
(1.75) (1.82) (0.09) (0.10)
Has pre-study savings account 0.33 0.35 -0.03 -0.02
(0.47) (0.48) (0.02) (0.03)
Savings balance in other formal accounts 68,980 80,087 -13,592 -15,252
(290,316) (430,749) (14,328) (16,636)
[0] [0] [0] [0]
Financial debt 287,326 464,643 -201,953* -277,172**
(2,227,464) (4,557,721) (109,849) (127,548)
[66,000] [55,800] [15,200]** [7,850]
Group Size 14.80 13.52 1.58*** 1.73***
(3.92) (3.68) (0.19) (0.22)
Number of Observations 2,687 571 2,687 2,687
Notes: In Columns (1)-(2), standard deviations are presented in parentheses below group means and medians are presented in
brackets. Columns (3)-(4) show the difference between treatment and control groups by regressing the variable of interest on
treatment dummies. All variables are at baseline in 2008. Robust standard errors clustered at the group level in Columns (3)-(4)
are shown in parentheses and medians in brackets. The number of observations varies slightly by variable depending on availability.
Monetary figures in Chilean pesos. 500 pesos = approximately 1 USD. Level of significance: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics and Balance of Randomization (Feedback Message Experiment)
Variable: All Difference Peer Difference Peer Difference Participants Exp. 2
Accounts Control Pressure and Control Information and Control and others in Exp. 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Education 9.72 9.66 0.06 0.12 0.09
(3.02) (3.06) (0.25) (0.25) (0.13)
Age 43.86 43.98 -0.81 0.42 0.69
(10.86) (10.79) (0.90) (0.90) (0.48)
Income per capita (monthly) 82,636 84,506 -3,851 -1,893 3,142
(69,502) (92,183) (5,811) (5,733) (2,438)
[70,000] [67,500] [2,500] [2,500] [3,500]*
Household size 4.38 4.39 0.12 -0.15 0.08
(1.69) (1.58) (0.14) (0.14) (0.07)
Has pre-study savings account 0.34 0.30 0.07* 0.03 0.01
(0.47) (0.46) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02)
Financial debt 240,167 231,013 25,630 2,728 -69,777
(578,855) (580,355) (48,185) (47,671) (91,815)
[74,856] [80,000] [-5,824] [-1,440] [11,856]**
Savings balance in study account (Jul 09) 12,759 14,767 -2,520 -3,574 8,830***
(104,377) (151,918) (8,689) (8,597) (2,753)
[1,130] [2,000] [-500]*** [-1,000]*** [1,130]***
Number of prior deposits in study account 1.52 1.49 -0.02 0.08 1.10***
(Aug 08-Jul 09) (3.82) (3.86) (0.32) (0.31) (0.11)
Number of prior withdrawals from study account 0.70 0.69 -0.02 0.05 0.48***
(Aug 08-Jul 09) (1.49) (1.41) (0.12) (0.12) (0.06)
Number of Observations 871 299 871 871 2,687
Notes: In Columns (1)-(2), standard deviations are presented in parentheses below group means and medians are presented in brackets. Columns (3)-(4) show the difference between
treatment and control groups, by regressing the variable of interest on treatment dummies. Column (5) shows the difference between the participants included in the Feedback Message
Experiment and others in the overall study sample (i.e., those who only participated in the Peer Group Experiment). All variables are at baseline in 2008 unless otherwise indicated.
Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses and medians in brackets. The number of observations varies slightly by variable depending on availability. Monetary amounts in
Chilean pesos. 500 pesos = approximately 1 USD. Level of significance: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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Table 3: The Effect of the Peer Group Treatment on Savings
# of Deposits Amount Deposited Average Monthly Balance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: Intent-to-Treat
Self-Help Peer Groups 0.836*** 14,183*** 7,826*** 3,286*** 4,050** 2,227** 1,817***
(0.162) (5,363) (2,830) (772) (1,888) (861) (392)
High-Interest Treatment 0.0597 12,615* 5,655 371 2,446 527 232
(0.104) (6,964) (3,642) (787) (1,810) (984) (368)
Constant 0.305*** 10,371*** 9,184*** 2,960*** 4,419*** 3,951*** 2,193***
(0.0710) (2,552) (1,963) (528) (930) (673) (269)
R-squared 0.022 0.001 0.002 0.012 0.001 0.004 0.017
F-test “Self-Help” = “High-Interest” p = 0.00 p = 0.85 p = 0.56 p = 0.00 p = 0.48 p = 0.06 p = 0.00
Panel B: Treatment on the (Instrumented) Treated
Self-Help Peer Groups 1.529*** 25,937*** 14,312*** 6,009*** 7,407** 4,073*** 3,323***
(0.277) (9,636) (5,042) (1,336) (3,405) (1,527) (664)
High-Interest Treatment 0.118 24,887* 11,155 732 4,826 1,040 458
(0.204) (13,756) (7,103) (1,540) (3,566) (1,925) (710)
Constant 0.305*** 10,371*** 9,184*** 2,960*** 4,419*** 3,951*** 2,193***
(0.0708) (2,544) (1,957) (526) (928) (671) (268)
Winsorized None None Top 1% Top 5% None Top 1% Top 5%
F-test “Self-Help” = “High-Interest” p = 0.00 p = 0.95 p = 0.65 p = 0.00 p = 0.54 p = 0.07 p = 0.00
Number of observations 2,687 2,687 2,687 2,687 2,687 2,687 2,687
Notes: Dependent variables: Total number of deposits in Column (1); Total amount deposited in Columns (2)-(4); Average balance
per month in Columns (5)-(7). All outcomes are for one year after the opening of the accounts and are measured between August
2008 and July 2009. Coefficients of OLS regressions in Panel A and coefficients of two-stage least squares in Panel B. Standard
errors clustered at the group level in parentheses. All monetary figures in Chilean pesos. 500 pesos = approximately 1 USD. Level of
significance: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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Table 4: The Effect of Feedback Text Messages on Savings
# of Deposits Amount Deposited Net New Savings Average Monthly Balance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Panel A: Intent-to-Treat
Assigned to text 0.268*** 6,015** 3,569** 1,197*** 7,810* 125 339* 8,985** 2,177 669
messages treatment (0.0926) (2,776) (1,464) (444) (4,241) (1,149) (184) (4,156) (1,373) (573)
Prior Balance 0.000000962** 0.135*** 0.0579*** 0.0121*** -0.678*** -0.0696*** -0.00193** 0.355*** 0.0962*** 0.0307***
(0.000000421) (0.0126) (0.00666) (0.00202) (0.0193) (0.00523) (0.000839) (0.0189) (0.00625) (0.00261)
Constant 0.126* 826 1,670 978*** -200 -3 134 -842 5,162*** 4,305***
(0.0753) (2,257) (1,190) (361) (3,449) (934) (150) (3,379) (1,116) (466)
R-squared 0.015 0.121 0.085 0.047 0.588 0.169 0.010 0.290 0.216 0.138
Panel B: Treatment on the (Instrumented) Treated
Treatment Group 0.655*** 14,693** 8,717** 2,923*** 19,078* 306 828* 21,946** 5,317 1,635
(0.221) (6,743) (3,551) (1,068) (10,390) (2,801) (445) (10,226) (3,339) (1,386)
Prior Balance 0.000000992** 0.136*** 0.0583*** 0.0122*** -0.677*** -0.0696*** -0.00190** 0.356*** 0.0964*** 0.0307***
(0.000000413) (0.0126) (0.00662) (0.00199) (0.0194) (0.00522) (0.000829) (0.0191) (0.00623) (0.00258)
Constant 0.119 668 1,576 947*** -405 -6 125 -1,077 5,105*** 4,288***
(0.0757) (2,303) (1,213) (365) (3,549) (957) (152) (3,494) (1,141) (473)
Control Group Mean 0.140 2,826 2,525 1,157 -10,211 -1,030 105 4,397 6,582 4,758
Winsorized None None Top 1% Top 5% None Top & Bottom 1% Top & Bottom 5% None Top & Bottom 1% Top & Bottom 5%
Observations 871 871 871 871 871 871 871 871 871 871
Notes: All outcomes are measured between August and October 2009, the duration of the Feedback Message Experiment. Net new savings = (deposits − withdrawals) during that period. Coefficients
of OLS regressions in Panel A and coefficients of two-stage least squares in Panel B. All monetary figures in Chilean pesos. 500 pesos = approximately 1 USD. Level of significance: *p < 0.1,
**p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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Table 5: Comparing the Effects of Peer Pressure and Peer Information
# of Deposits Amount Deposited Net New Savings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Peer Pressure 0.237** 6,282* 4,366** 1,311** 5,844 -492 281
(0.108) (3,236) (1,706) (518) (4,943) (1,339) (215)
Peer Information 0.298*** 5,760* 2,804* 1,087** 9,696** 717 395*
(0.107) (3,202) (1,688) (512) (4,891) (1,325) (213)
Prior Balance 0.000000963** 0.135*** 0.0579*** 0.0121*** -0.678*** -0.0696*** -0.00193**
(0.000000422) (0.0126) (0.00666) (0.00202) (0.0193) (0.00523) (0.000840)
Constant 0.126* 826 1,670 979*** -201 -3 134
(0.0753) (2,258) (1,191) (361) (3,449) (935) (150)
Winsorized None None Top 1% Top 5% None Top & Bottom 1% Top & Bottom 5%
R-squared 0.016 0.121 0.086 0.047 0.588 0.170 0.010
F-test “Pressure” = “Information” p = 0.575 p = 0.872 p = 0.363 p = 0.667 p = 0.439 p = 0.370 p = 0.598
Number of Observations 871 871 871 871 871 871 871
Notes: All outcomes are measured between August and October 2009, the duration of the Feedback Message Experiment. Net new savings = (deposits −
withdrawals) during that period. All monetary figures in Chilean pesos. 500 pesos = approximately 1 USD. Level of significance: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05,
***p < 0.01
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APPENDIX FOR ONLINE PUBLICATION
A Text messages (English Translation)
Peer Pressure Treatment
• Messages to participants:
– In case of deposit
“Congratulations! Last week you made your weekly deposit and we just
informed your Savings Buddy of your achievement.”
– In case of failure to deposit
“Ooh! Last week you did not achieve your weekly deposit and we just informed
your Savings Buddy.”
• Messages to Savings Buddy:
– In case of deposit by the participant
“Good news, last week [NAME OF PARTICIPANT] made his/her weekly
deposit. Thanks for being his/her Savings Buddy!”
– In case of failure to deposit
“Unfortunately last week [NAME OF PARTICIPANT] did not make his/her
weekly deposit. Thanks for being his/her Savings Buddy!”
Peer Information Treatment
• In case of deposit
“Congratulations! Last week you made your weekly deposit. [PERCENT OF OTH-
ERS]% of other participants similar to you made a deposit.”
• In case of failure to deposit
“Ooh! Last week you did not achieve your weekly deposit. [PERCENT OF OTH-
ERS]% of other participants similar to you made a deposit.”
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B Screening Questions & Setting of Savings Goal
During the follow-up survey, all participants who had opened a saving account during the
Peer Group Experiment were asked the following questions (English translation):
(1) Do you send or receive text messages on your cell phone from time to time? If response
is no because the participant does not have a cell phone, the participant is excluded from
the Feedback Message Experiment.
(2) Do your relatives or friends send or receive text messages through their cell phones
from time to time?
There is a new service that is incorporating the benefits of mobile technology to help
people achieve their savings goals. Many feel that a weekly reminder of their personal
savings goals will help them achieve their savings plans.
Therefore, the new service gives people the option of receiving a weekly text message on
their cell phones reminding them of their savings goals, and motivating them to achieve
them. This helps people achieve the level of savings they desire and to follow their original
plan.
(3) Do you believe it is a good idea to offer this service for free to those who have a Fondo
Esperanza savings account?
(4) If such a service existed, and you were offered the opportunity to participate completely
free, would you like to participate and receive text messages to support you in achieving
your savings goals? If response is no, the participant is excluded from the Feedback Message
Experiment.
(5) If such a service was offered, for what purpose would you like to save in the next 3
months?
(6) How much money do you want to save weekly over the next three months to achieve
this goal?
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C Additional Tables
Table A1: Intensity of Elements of Peers Group Treatment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Percent who Percent who Percent who Percent who Percent No Answer
responded a) responded b) responded c) responded d) or Don’t know
Frequency of group leader motivating to save 50.4 21.9 18.7 4.3 4.7
Frequency of sticker distribution 23.0 14.6 25.2 15.0 22.2
Frequency of using tracking form 52.0 10.8 13.6 7.0 16.6
Frequency of giving stickers in absence of a deposit slip 4.6 4.2 4.0 82.1 5.1
Were awards given? 47.9 29.0 N/A N/A 23.1
Notes: This table provides summary statistics of answers to the following questions from the follow-up survey: 1) “With what frequency did the group leader
motivate the group to save in the FE accounts?”, 2) “With what frequency did the group leader distribute stickers when participants met their weekly savings
goal?”, 3) “With what frequency did the group leader use the tracking form?”, 4) “Have members of the group received stickers without showing their deposit
slip?”, and 5) “Was an award given to participants who met their savings goal?”. The possible answers for the first three questions were: “Every meeting” = a,
“In the majority of the meetings” = b, “Once in a while” = c, “In none of the meetings” = d. The possible answers for the fourth question were: “Many times”
= a, “2-3 times” = b, “Once” = c, and “Never” = d. Finally, the possible answers to the last question were: “Yes” = a, “No” = b. “Don’t know” or no answer
recorded as missing.
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Table A2: Time Inconsistencies (Peer Group Experiment)
# of Deposits Average Monthly Balance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Time Inconsistenta× Self Help 0.572** 0.574* 654 644 2,627 2,489
(0.290) (0.300) (3,028) (2,921) (1,595) (1,612)
Time Inconsistenta× High-Interest 0.322* 0.331* 3,942 5,468* 2,836* 3,042*
(0.194) (0.192) (3,374) (3,300) (1,707) (1,811)
Time Inconsistent -0.0100 -0.00191 -2,100 -1,716 -1,454 -1,078
(0.114) (0.113) (1,398) (1,410) (1,141) (1,163)
Self-Help Peer Groups 0.654*** -0.790 3,930 -12,164 1,452 -9,339*
(0.157) (0.797) (2,653) (8,430) (1,014) (5,142)
High-Interest Treatment -0.0516 -0.0271 1,225 -5,830 -356 -3,403
(0.0996) (0.568) (2,193) (11,374) (1,125) (7,415)
Constant 0.308*** 1.081** 5,000*** 15,007** 4,353*** 10,771***
(0.0748) (0.522) (1,189) (6,094) (810) (4,082)
Control variables (and interactions) No Yes No Yes No Yes
Winsorized None None None None Top 1% Top 1%
R-squared 0.027 0.037 0.001 0.010 0.005 0.023
Number of Observations 2,687 2,623 2,687 2,623 2,687 2,623
Notes: Dependent variables: Total number of deposits in Columns (1) and (2); Total amount deposited in
Columns (3) - (6). Control variables (fully interacted with the treatment dummies) are: education, age,
household size, initial household income, financial debt, last recorded amount of credit with FE, and bank
savings. Controls are demeaned so that the constant term corresponds to the control group mean. All outcomes
are measured between August 2008 and July 2009. Standard errors clustered at the group level in parentheses.
All monetary figures in Chilean pesos. 500 pesos = approximately 1 USD. Level of significance: *p < 0.1,
**p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
aTime inconsistency is measured by giving survey participants choices between x pesos in time t and y pesos
(x < y) in time t+1 month (similar to e.g., Ashraf et al., 2006b; Meier and Sprenger, 2010). Individuals make
those choices for t = today and t = six months from today, which allows us to categorize individuals as being
time inconsistent, i.e. present-biased, if they are more impatient when t = today than when t = 6 months. Using
this definition (in which we use the first switching point to determine preferences), about 30% of participants
are classified as time inconsistent.
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Table A3: Effects of Peer Group and High-Interest Treatments on Self-Reported
Savings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Deposit Withdrawal Amount Amount Amount
Panel A: Formal Savings
Self-Help Peer Groups 0.0319 0.0313 5,323 7,338 7,360
(0.0500) (0.0398) (7,991) (6,814) (5,945)
High-Interest Groups -0.0216 0.00968 20,705 14,746* 13,124*
(0.0491) (0.0463) (12,642) (8,202) (7,045)
Constant 0.356*** 0.241*** 60,540*** 57,011*** 51,322***
(0.0416) (0.0331) (6,817) (5,538) (4,827)
R-squared 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002
Panel B: All Savings
Self-Help Peer Groups -2,250 -225 1,736
(16,036) (14,671) (12,767)
High-Interest Groups 20,477 17,901 19,036
(19,112) (16,312) (14,427)
Constant 155,644*** 150,070*** 137,361***
(13,882) (12,583) (10,956)
R-squared 0.001 0.001 0.002
Winsorized None Top 1% Top 5%
Observations 884 882 2,687 2,687 2,687
Notes: Dependent variables in Columns (1) and (2): dummy variable that is 1 if, in the last
6 months, depositing (Column 1) or withdrew (Column 2) money in another bank account or
housing account, and 0 otherwise. Dependent variables: “Formal savings” in Columns (3)-(5)
includes self-reported savings amounts in the Fondo Esperanza account, as well as in another
bank, a housing account or a cooperative. “All savings” in Columns (3)-(5) includes all formal
savings listed above as well as self-reported amount saved at home or in the business, in a
ROSCA, with another person, in advanced payments, and an “other” category. If individuals
indicated that they had savings in a particular account, e.g. in a ROSCA, but left the amount
blank, we imputed the median value. OLS estimates with standard errors clustered at the
group level in parentheses. All outcomes are from the 2009 follow-up survey. Values in Chilean
pesos. 500 Chilean pesos = approximately 1 USD. Level of significance: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05,
***p < 0.01
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Table A4: Effects of Peer Group and High-Interest Treatments on Components of Self-Reported Savings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Another Bank Home or Business Cooperative ROSCA Other Person Advanced Purchase Other FE Account Housing Account
Self-Help Peer Groups 122 -6,680 777 533 1,342 -5,532 -172 4,968*** -536
(5,332) (6,852) (1,658) (4,086) (1,194) (7,530) (779) (1,845) (6,191)
High-Interest Treatment 4,038 -3,050 -505 5,998 720 -10,180 1,862 1,618 15,954
(6,531) (7,090) (1,575) (5,033) (1,200) (8,237) (1,571) (1,960) (12,108)
Constant 22,290*** 46,478*** 2,522* 8,859** 2,794*** 54,376*** 1,610** 5,598*** 42,218***
(4,658) (6,081) (1,306) (3,564) (849) (6,677) (620) (1,054) (4,959)
R-squared 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002
Observations 2,278 2,278 2,277 2,277 2,277 2,278 2,275 2,278 2,278
Notes: Dependent variables: amounts of different types of savings. If individuals indicated that they had savings of a particular type, but left the
amount missing, we imputed the median value. All outcomes are from the 2009 follow-up survey. Values in Chilean pesos. 500 Chilean pesos =
approximately 1 USD. Level of significance: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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Table A5: Effects of Peer Group and High-Interest Treatments on Borrowing
(1) (2) (3)
Probability of Probability of Probability of
FE Borrowing short-term borrowing long-term borrowing
Self-Help Peer Groups × Post -0.0399 0.00673 -0.0225
(0.0578) (0.0422) (0.0291)
High-Interest Treatment × Post -0.0213 0.0573 -0.00281
(0.0741) (0.0435) (0.0321)
Post -0.237*** -0.595*** -0.0945***
(0.0462) (0.0340) (0.0234)
Constant 0.775*** 0.897*** 0.799***
(0.0118) (0.00768) (0.00549)
R-squared 0.148 0.539 0.042
F-test “Self-Help” = “High-Interest” 0.783 0.172 0.482
Observations 4,936 4,956 4,957
Notes: Dependent variables are dummies that take on the value of 1 if the household reports in the baseline
and follow-up survey having debt from the following source: Fondo Esperanza in Column (1), short-term debt
(owing to family, services, and institutions including cooperatives, moneylenders, goods suppliers, business
partners, and store credit) in Column (2) and other long-term debt (bank loans, mortgages, and IOUs) in
Column (3). Regressions include baseline and follow-up data with individual fixed effects. Standard errors
clustered at the group level in parenthesis. Values in Chilean pesos. 500 Chilean pesos = approximately 1
USD. Level of significance: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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Table A6: The Effect of Feedback Text Messages on Savings (Without Controlling for “Prior Balance”)
# of Deposits Amount Deposited Net New Savings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: Intent-to-Treat
Assigned to text 0.265*** 5,601* 3,392** 1,160** 9,883 338 345*
messages treatment (0.0928) (2,952) (1,525) (453) (6,594) (1,260) (185)
Constant 0.140* 2,826 2,525** 1,157*** -10,211* -1,031 105
(0.0752) (2,392) (1,236) (367) (5,344) (1,021) (150)
R-squared 0.009 0.004 0.006 0.007 0.003 0.000 0.004
Panel B: Treatment on the (Instrumented) Treated
Treatment Group 0.647*** 13,677* 8,282** 2,832*** 24,133 825 842*
(0.222) (7,176) (3,703) (1,090) (16,126) (3,070) (446)
Constant 0.134* 2,689 2,442* 1,128*** -10,453* -1,039 97
(0.0755) (2,440) (1,259) (371) (5,484) (1,044) (151)
Control Group Mean 0.140 2,826 2,525 1,157 -10,211 -1,030 105
Winsorized None None Top 1% Top 5% None Top & Bottom 1% Top & Bottom 5%
Observations 871 871 871 871 871 871 871
Notes: This table replicates the specification in Table 4 without controlling for “Prior Balance” in their savings account. All outcomes
are measured between August and October 2009, the duration of the Feedback Message Experiment. Net new savings = (deposits
− withdrawals) during that period. Coefficients of OLS regressions in Panel A and coefficients of two-stage least squares in Panel
B. All monetary figures in Chilean pesos. 500 Chilean pesos = approximately 1 USD. Level of significance: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05,
***p < 0.01
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Table A7: Effects of the Feedback Message Experiment by Treatment Assignment in the Peer Group Experiment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Take-up Number of Deposits Amount Deposited Net New Savings
SMS Treatment × Peer Group Treatment -0.0810 0.0930 -7,313 8,161
(0.0589) (0.189) (6,029) (13,479)
SMS Treatment 0.455*** 0.222 9,839** 4,831
(0.0455) (0.146) (4,655) (10,407)
Peer Group Treatment 0.0162 0.114 3,086 -8,203
(0.0481) (0.155) (4,925) (11,012)
Constant -1.18e-14 0.0702 917 -5,136
(0.0379) (0.122) (3,874) (8,662)
R-squared 0.191 0.014 0.006 0.003
Control Group Mean 0.010 0.140 2,826 -10,211
Observations 871 871 871 871
Notes: “SMS Treatment” is a dummy variable indicating random assignment to either of the treatment groups in the Feedback
Message Experiment. “Peer Group Treatment” is a dummy variable indicating random assignment to the Peer Group Treatment
in Experiment 1. Dependent variables are a dummy variable for take-up of the Feedback Message Treatment, number of deposits,
amount of deposits and amount of new savings, respectively. All outcomes are measured between August and October 2009,
the duration of the Feedback Message Experiment. Net new savings = (deposits − withdrawals) during that period. Values in
Chilean pesos. 500 Chilean pesos = approximately 1 USD. Level of significance: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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Table A8: Effects of the Feedback Message Experiment (with endogenous controls)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Take-up Number of Amount Net New
Deposits Deposited Savings
Panel A: Prior Number of Deposits
SMS Treatment × Prior Number of Deposits 0.00549 0.0560** 4,028*** 3,057*
(0.00753) (0.0224) (722) (1,718)
Treatment Group 0.401*** 0.177* -566 5,276
(0.0310) (0.0923) (2,976) (7,080)
Prior Number of Deposits 0.000790 0.0906*** 635 -1,842
(0.00607) (0.0180) (582) (1,384)
Constant 0.00885 0.00503 1,877 -7,458
(0.0251) (0.0747) (2,407) (5,727)
R-squared 0.190 0.153 0.125 0.006
Panel B: Prior Amount Deposited (in 1000s of pesos)
SMS Treatment × Prior Amount Deposited -0.0000371 0.00104** 191*** 508***
(0.000153) (0.000490) (13) (17)
Treatment Group 0.411*** 0.228** -1,257 -10,873***
(0.0295) (0.0942) (2,542) (3,254)
Prior Amount Deposited -0.00000436 0.000145 5 -547***
(0.0000931) (0.000298) (8) (10)
Constant 0.0102 0.135* 2,606 11,954***
(0.0237) (0.0759) (2,046) (2,619)
R-squared 0.188 0.020 0.291 0.767
Panel C: Prior Balance (in 1000s of pesos)
SMS Treatment × Prior Balance -0.000159 0.00324*** 496*** 817***
(0.000295) (0.000939) (23) (33)
Treatment Group 0.411*** 0.227** -202 -2,439
(0.0291) (0.0928) (2,253) (3,285)
Prior Balance -0.00000281 0.0000739 -0.458 -901.9***
(0.000154) (0.000492) (12) (17)
Constant 0.0101 0.139* 2,833 3,108
(0.0235) (0.0749) (1,819) (2,653)
R-squared 0.188 0.029 0.431 0.757
Control Group Mean 0.010 0.140 2,826 -10,211
Observations 871 871 871 871
Notes: This table calculates the effect of the Feedback Message Experiment with endogenous control variables.
“SMS Treatment” is a dummy variable indicating random assignment to either of the treatment groups in the
Feedback Message Experiment. All outcomes are measured between August and October 2009, the duration of
the Feedback Message Experiment. Net new savings is (deposits − withdrawals) during that period. Values in
Chilean pesos. 500 Chilean pesos = approximately 1 USD. Level of significance: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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Table A9: Effects of the Peer Group Treatment for the Feedback Message Sample
(1) (2) (3)
# of Deposits Amount Deposited Net New Savings
Self-Help Peer Groups 0.863*** 8,065 10,275*
(0.185) (5,255) (5,433)
High-Interest Treatment 0.0149 6,813 5,829
(0.104) (4,296) (4,349)
Constant 0.269*** 4,752*** -2,715
(0.0771) (1,799) (3,804)
R-squared 0.051 0.002 0.003
Observations 871 871 871
Notes: This table calculates the effects of the Peer Group Experiment for August to
October 2008 among the sample of the 871 participants who also ended up participating
in the Feedback Message Experiment. Net new savings = (deposits − withdrawals)
during that period. Standard errors clustered at the group level in parentheses. Monetary
figures in Chilean pesos. 500 Chilean pesos = approximately 1 USD. Level of significance:
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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Table A10: Choice of Savings Buddy
Frequency Percent
Why did you choose your Savings Buddy?
Because my Savings Buddy . . .
. . . and I save together in the same account. 18 12.24
. . . is very strict and will motivate me to comply with my savings goals. 45 30.61
. . . is very relaxed and will understand if I do not reach my savings goals. 7 4.76
. . . is very close to me and I share my financial information with them. 42 28.57
. . . is a role model when it comes to savings, very organized and always 28 19.05
complies with their savings goals.
Other 4 2.72
No response 3 2.04
Number of observations 147 100.00
What is your relationship to your Savings Buddy?
Partner 37 25.17
Parent 8 5.44
Child 48 32.65
Other relative 20 13.61
Close friend 25 17.01
Neighbor 3 2.04
Other 4 2.72
No response 2 1.36
Number of observations 147 100.00
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Table A11: Reasons Not to Transfer Money into High-Interest Account
Mental accounting (“Because the alternative account is destined towards a
specific goal that I do not want to mix with the other savings account”)
66%
Uncertainty (“Because I am not sure whether the favorable conditions of the
account in the study will continue”)
19%
Trust (“The other bank is more trustworthy”) 16%
Distance (“The other bank is closer”) 12%
Interest rate (“The other account has a higher interest rate”) 11%
Cost of withdrawing and redepositing 9%
Having an outstanding loan at the other bank 8%
Notes: This table shows the percentage of individuals among those who did not transfer money
into the high-interest account who indicated this reason as “very important.”
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